



16 January 2026

Alan Raine
Committee Secretary
Senate Select Committee on Information Integrity on Climate Change and Energy
Department of the Senate
Parliament House
By email: climateintegrity.sen@aph.gov.au

Dear Alan

Thank you for inviting Meta to appear before the Committee on Information Integrity on Climate Change and Energy on 6 February 2026.

We are unfortunately unable to appear before the Committee at the requested time, due to a scheduling conflict. Given the Committee has a reporting deadline of Tuesday 24 March, 2026 and has twice asked Meta to appear, we are providing further detail in the attached about our approach to information integrity, which we hope will be of assistance to the Committee's deliberations.

Please let us know if the Committee has any follow-up questions. We also note that given the multi-faceted and fragmented nature of the digital industry and given information integrity is a complex and ecosystem-wide matter, Meta is not well-positioned to provide a holistic perspective on behalf of all digital platforms. We therefore suggest that our industry association, DIGI, may be best placed to represent a more comprehensive view on the role and work of our industry in helping to ensure information integrity across our diverse services.

Thank you again for the opportunity to contribute to this Inquiry.

Yours sincerely



Mia Garlick
Regional Director of Policy for Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific

ATTACHMENT A: Meta's approach to combatting dis- and misinformation

To address dis- and misinformation, we use a combination of enforcement technology, human review and programs like fact-checking, to identify, review and take action on this type of content. Our strategy comprises three main pillars: remove, reduce and inform. As outlined in our [misinformation policy](#), our approach reflects our attempt to balance our values of expression, safety, dignity, authenticity, and privacy.

Before turning towards Meta's approach to these issues, it is important to recognise the distinctions between 'misinformation' and 'disinformation', because the policy concerns underlying each differ, and the most appropriate responses from platforms like Meta will also be different.

Misinformation is often used interchangeably with disinformation. Disinformation refers to false information that is shared intentionally to mislead others; therefore, Meta's approach to this issue focuses on the *actor* and *behaviour*.

Misinformation refers to *content* that is misleading or false, but may be shared without an intent to mislead. While there may be some overlap (actors engaged in disinformation may also utilise misinformation), disinformation and misinformation are not the same issue.

The closest term that Meta uses to describe disinformation is coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB).

Three-pillar approach: Remove, Reduce, Inform

Meta removes coordinated inauthentic behavior and we remove misinformation where it is likely to directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm, or interfere with the functioning of political processes, such as elections.

We address the problem of disinformation through our policy against [coordinated inauthentic behaviour \(CIB\)](#). Both foreign interference and CIB rely on two elements: inauthenticity - where users misrepresent themselves through false identities, and coordination - where networks of Meta assets work together with the intention to mislead users.

Specifically, our policies prohibit people engaging in inauthentic behaviour, which, as mentioned above, refers to a variety of complex forms of deception, performed by a network of inauthentic assets controlled by the same individual or individuals, with the goal of deceiving Meta or our community or to evade enforcement under the Community Standards.

We prohibit entities that participate in CIB, which is commonly referred to as disinformation. We [define CIB](#) as “particularly sophisticated forms of Inauthentic Behavior where false identities are central to the operation and operators use adversarial methods to evade detection or appear authentic”.

CIB, as we define it, will be slightly broader than the strict interpretation of “foreign interference”, as CIB may include inauthentic coordination by domestic actors. When we investigate and remove these operations, we focus on behavior, not content, regardless of whether these operations are foreign or domestic. Using both automated and manual detection, we continuously remove accounts and Pages connected to networks we took down in the past. In our [adversarial threat reports](#), we publish detailed case studies on key cases that highlight substantial adversarial shifts, new tactics or important new insights.

With respect to misinformation, we remove it where it is likely to directly contribute to the risk of imminent physical harm, or interfere with the functioning of political processes, such as elections. In determining what constitutes misinformation in these categories, we partner with independent experts who possess knowledge and expertise to assess the truth of the content and whether it is likely to directly contribute to the risk of imminent harm.

For all other misinformation, we focus on reducing its prevalence or creating an environment that fosters a productive dialogue. We know that people often use misinformation in harmless ways, such as to exaggerate a point, or in humour or satire. They also may share their experience through stories that contain inaccuracies. In some cases, people share deeply-held personal opinions that others consider false or share information that they believe to be true, but which others consider incomplete or misleading.

Meta prohibits content and behavior in other areas that often overlap with the spread of misinformation. For example, our Community Standards, which govern what is and is not allowed on our platforms, prohibit [fake accounts](#), [fraud](#), and [coordinated inauthentic behavior](#).

AI-generated content

In response to this Inquiry's consideration of the potential role of AI-generated content in facilitating the spread of dis- and misinformation, the following section shares details on Meta's integrity efforts with respect to this content. Our Community Standards apply to all content on our services, regardless of whether it was created by AI technology. As a signatory to the [Tech Accord to Combat Deceptive Use of AI in 2024 Elections](#), Meta has been working across many channels to align with the Accord's goals, including through public reporting, contributions to industry coalitions and standards organisations, releasing of open source tools, and a variety of mechanisms in the user-facing surfaces of our products and services.

Since the start of 2024, in certain cases, advertisers on Meta's services must disclose when they use generative AI or other digital techniques to create or alter a political or social-issue ad. This disclosure obligation applies if the ad contains a photorealistic image or video, or realistic sounding audio, that was digitally created or altered to depict a real person as saying or doing something they did not say or do.

The disclosure obligation also applies if an ad depicts a realistic-looking person that does not exist or a realistic-looking event that did not happen, alters footage of a real event, or depicts a realistic event that allegedly occurred, but that is not a true image, video, or audio recording of the event. We also add information on the ad when an advertiser discloses that the content has been digitally created or altered. This information also appears in the [Meta Ad Library](#). If we determine that an advertiser has not disclosed as required, we will reject the ad and repeated failure by an advertiser to disclose may result in penalties against the advertiser.

Since its launch in 2023, we have added both a visible "Meta AI" watermark and invisible watermarking to photorealistic images created using our Meta AI Imagine feature. We also label images from other image generators based on our detection of industry-shared signals, and given people a tool to self-disclose that they are uploading other AI-generated content so that we can provide labels to inform our users.

We request people to use this disclosure and label tool when they post organic content with a photorealistic video or realistic-sounding audio that was digitally created or altered. We now add an "AI info" label and share whether the content is labeled either because of industry-shared signals, or because someone self-disclosed. For content that we detect was only modified or edited by AI tools, we are moving the "AI info" label to the post's menu.

Australian third-party fact checking partners

Meta's fact-checking program aims to identify and address viral misinformation, particularly clear hoaxes that have no basis in fact. In Australia, at present, we partner with third-party fact checking organisations certified through the non-partisan [International Fact-Checking Network \(IFCN\)](#) to review and rate the accuracy of the most viral content on our platforms. Our Australian partners are [Australian Associated Press \(AAP\)](#) and [Agence France-Presse \(AFP\)](#).

Our independent third-party fact-checking partners prioritise probably false claims that are timely, trending and consequential. Meta applies a warning label to content found to be misinformation by the fact-checking organisations. Recent fact checks that AAP and AFP have published on climate-related claims may be found [here](#) and [here](#) respectively.

In alignment with Meta's public [announcements](#) on 7 January 2025 about the third-party fact-checking program, we will continue to evaluate the applicability of these practices and policies to Meta products. We will also regularly review the appropriateness of making adjustments in response to changes in our practices, such as the deployment of Community Notes.

Australian Code of Practice on Disinformation and Misinformation

Meta is a founding signatory of the Digital Industry Group Inc. (DIGI)'s [Australian Code of Practice on Disinformation and Misinformation](#), which was launched in 2021 and is a voluntary industry initiative that aims to tackle online disinformation and misinformation through transparency, accountability, and collaboration. DIGI is conducting a review of the Code in the first half of 2026.

Under the Code, Meta has committed to safeguards to protect people in Australia against harmful dis- and misinformation, and to adopting a range of scalable measures that reduce its spread and visibility. We have opted into all seven of the Code's objectives across Facebook and Instagram. To date, Meta has published five transparency reports under the Code, with the latest launched in May 2025. Our [2025 report](#) outlines the steps we took during the 2024 calendar year to meet the 40 commitments that we opted into over that reporting period.

Some of Meta's latest efforts to combat dis- and misinformation include:

- **Combating Global Adversarial Threats.** We work to disrupt and remove the majority of CIB networks before they are able to build authentic audiences in their countries of operation. As part of our work to counter CIB, we provide

detailed case studies on key cases that highlight substantial adversarial shifts, new tactics, or important new insights in our [adversarial threat reporting](#). In our latest [report](#) published in December 2025, we shared insights into the long-running ‘Endless Mayfly’ Iranian Influence Operation, the proliferation in the use of seemingly unwitting local individuals to executive influence operations in Africa on behalf of Russia-based actors, as well as five other CIB operations that we removed, including operations targeting Poland, India and Moldova.

- Partnering with Australian Associated Press FactCheck to deliver **media literacy awareness campaigns** that aim to encourage critical thinking and equip people with the skills they need to spot and avoid dis- and misinformation, including around the 2025 Federal Election. Our 2024 awareness campaign, which focused on building awareness and critical thinking around AI-generated images, ran across Facebook and Instagram in Australia for four weeks over October-November 2024 and featured a series of video and still image content. The campaign reached 2.53 million people in Australia and was viewed more than 6.15 million times.
- Supporting a range of **research and events** to enable ongoing dialogue and debate around information integrity issues. For example, in September 2025, we co-hosted an “Information Integrity in the Gen AI Era” event with DIGI, which brought together government, academic, civil society and industry experts to discuss the information integrity challenges and opportunities as Generative AI technology becomes increasingly part of everyday life in Australia. Meta also supported a [study](#) led by Professor Andrea Carson at La Trobe University released in September 2025, which analysed more than three million posts from 25 Australian news publishers to better understand how content is distributed, how audiences engage with news topics, and the nature of dis- and misinformation spread.